A South Korean container ship completed a voyage to Western Europe through the Arctic Ocean off the northern coast of Russia in October, fueling Seoul’s hopes of exploiting the route as a shortcut for trade.
The ship made the round trip from Busan to Rotterdam in just 50 days, saving at least 10 days compared to the fastest travel times along the more commonly used Suez Canal route. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is not only around 7,000 kilometers (4,350 miles) shorter, it also avoids the geopolitical flashpoint of the Middle East.
But the faster delivery times might not exactly trigger celebrations across western European capitals.
Analysts say the nations arrayed against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine fear that South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is looking to boost Seoul’s economic relations with Moscow. This would run contrary to the efforts to cut off Russia made by Kyiv and its Western alies.
One of the reasons for South Korea testing the Arctic route is its undoubtedly large economic potential. But analysts told DW that Seoul also hopes that, by having a working relationship with the Russian regime, they could sway its leader Vladimir Putin against providing more weapons to North Korea.
Lee’s government, they suggest, will need to navigate the geopolitical waters extremely carefully.
Climate change opening up NSR
The container vessel PanStar Acro left the South Korean port of Busan on August 22 and navigated around Russia to reach the southern British port of Felixstowe, then continued its journey by sailing to Rotterdam in the Netherlands and Gdansk in Poland, before heading back along the NSR.
For decades, the NSR was impassable due to the North Pole ice cover. With the ice in retreat due to climate change, navigation is becoming possible, although commercial ships often need to be accompanied by an ice-breaker vessel at certain times of year.
According to the Arctic Council, an international body which includes the US, Russia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland, last year saw a record 1,812 vessels operating in the Arctic. That marks an increase of 40% compared to 2013.
The NSR “presents significant economic potential” for South Korea by linking it more closely to the key markets of Europe while bypassing the challenging waters of the northwest Indian Ocean, said Joseph Kristanto, a maritime security analyst at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
“In addition to potentially lowering shipping costs and transit times, the route’s development could strengthen Busan’s position as a regional maritime hub and create opportunities for South Korea’s shipbuilding sector.”
The Lee government has outlined plans for regular commercial services on the NSR by 2030, with the first Korean ship to complete the voyage merely a test of the logistics.
Fears of ‘strategic dependency’
The danger, however, is that by developing the NSR as South Korea’s favored route to Europe, “it could introduce a new form of strategic dependency on Russia as Moscow exercises considerable control over navigation along its Arctic coastline,” said Kristanto.
“From the European perspective, closer economic engagement with Russia risks undermining efforts to isolate Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.”
Kristanto pointed out that Moscow could apply pressure through regulations and “the provision of icebreaker assistance.”
The analyst also said that European diplomats’ concerns over Seoul’s recent engagement with Moscow go beyond the NSR and include the alleged delivery of around 165,000 tons of fuel — aboard sanctioned Russian tankers — to Russia in August.
All of this is happening as Pyongyang, Seoul’s archrival, is sending troops to help Russia in its war against Ukraine.
Was Seoul’s row with Kyiv a calculated move?
“South Korea is very interested in accessing the NSR as climate change means that a route that was previously impossible to use is now accessible and makes perfect economic sense,” said Andrei Lankov, a Russian-born professor of history and international relations at Seoul’s Kookmin University.
At the same time, Seoul is “trying to send signals to the Russian government that it is willing to manage relations,” he added.
It also coincides with Seoul taking a firmer stance against Ukraine, a position that dates back to September, when President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the UN General Assembly and confirmed that two North Koreans who had been taken prisoner in Ukraine had been moved to South Korea. Seoul reacted angrily and claimed that Zelenskyy had violated an agreement to keep the transfer of the two POWs secret.
The dispute degenerated into a major diplomatic spat, with Seoul demanding apologies and ultimately withdrawing a number of its diplomats from Kyiv.
Lankov believes the row may have been somewhat performative on Seoul’s part as it allowed Lee’s administration to distance itself from Kyiv and resist pressure to provide material help to Ukraine. He said this stance would have been appreciated in Moscow.
“And then Russia could reciprocate by not providing North Korea with advanced and dangerous military technology,” Lankov added.
Korea keeps low profile while waiting for Ukraine war to end
“Right now, South Korea wants to fly under the radar, to examine the possibilities and be prepared for when the war is over, and sanctions on Russia are lifted in the future,” said Lankov. “That’s the economic plan, but they are also hoping that by working with Moscow they can halt the transfer of more weapons to the North.”
Kristanto also expects Seoul to “pursue a cautious and incremental approach.”
“Seoul is unlikely to abandon the initiative altogether, particularly given growing Chinese interest in Arctic shipping, but it will also seek to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing its Western partners,” he said.
“Ultimately, South Korea is not necessarily choosing between Russia and the West, but attempting to preserve a potentially valuable economic opportunity without compromising its more fundamental strategic relationships.”