When Iraq’s new Prime Minister AliĀ al-Zaidi has talks inĀ the White House on Tuesday, it is highly likely he’llĀ discussĀ more than one uncomfortable topic. On the table is what is potentially the most uncomfortable subject of all, given the US-Iran war: the role that Iran-affiliated paramilitaries play in Iraq.
Most of the paramilitaries, often grouped together as the Popular Mobilization Front, or Ā PMF,Ā were first formed in 2014 when religious leaders called upon able-bodied men to fight the extremist group known as theĀ “Islamic State.” They now number around 240,000 fighters and have an annual budget of about $3.5 billion (ā‚¬3 billion).
Some ā€” but not all ā€” PMF factions are considered part of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance,” which also includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza. During the ongoing conflict between Iran and the US, certain PMF groups are thought to be behindĀ attacks on US basesĀ in Iraq, Kuwait andĀ Jordan.
Which is why the US wants to see them disarmed.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio addressed the issue while in the United Arab Emirates last month.
“You can’t have the end of hostilities and conflicts in the region as long as Iranian proxies are launching missiles and drones from Iraq and are participating in terrorism,” Rubio told reporters.
Pressuring Iraq, withholding oil revenues
Over the past year, the US has increased pressure on the Iraqi government to tackle this issue, including by designating several more PMF factions “foreign terrorist organizations,” imposing sanctions on businesses associated with the PMF, threatening to block Iraq’s oil revenues via US banks, and by withholding foreign currency shipments.
The Iraqi government has responded by saying that, by the end of September, all arms should be brought under the control of the state and that any groups that don’t agree will be prosecuted.
In late May, influential cleric Muqtada al-Sadr ordered his armed faction, Saraya al-Salam (in English, peace brigades), to hand over weapons to the state. Around a week later, the Iraqi government said it had received information on personnel, weapons and equipment.
In early June, two other Iraqi paramilitaries ā€” AsaibĀ AhlĀ al-Haq (in English, league of the righteous) and Kataib Imam Ali (the Imam Ali brigades) ā€” also agreed to end organizational ties to the PMF and to eventually transfer weapons and personnel to the state.
But just as quickly as the announcements came, so did the doubts.
AsaibĀ AhlĀ al-Haq, or AAH, has been active since 2006 and was well known for attacking US troops occupying Iraq after their 2003 invasion of the country. Even after most American soldiers left the country, AAH retained a reputation for criminal activities, including theft, violence, kidnappings and murder. AAH and its proxies, which often go by another name, have also been accused of targeting US bases and US allies inside Iraq, during the current US-Iran war.
This promise to disarm means “moving what you hold in your right hand to your left,” sources close to the PMF told London-based, pan-Arab newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat.
It made sense for the groups to give their weapons to the state because they virtually are the state, other commentators argued. Some described the move as “rebranding.”
From violence to politics
Many PMF groups also have political representation and altogether their parties in the Iraqi parliament currently hold a majority.
“After last year’s parliamentary elections, the militias’ political wingsĀ hold a quarter of the seats in parliament, control ministries, influence the judiciary and command significant economic resources,” analyst Omar al-Nidawi wrote for Washington-based think tank, the Stimson Center, in June. The new prime minister “serves at the pleasure of these powerful militia-aligned groups,” he added.
So if it happens at all, that makes any disarmament very difficult to monitor, al-Nidawi, who is director of programs at the Enabling Peace in Iraq Center, told DW.
“In a complex environment like Iraq, where the state’s weak, you ideally require external observers to be able to verify that ā€¦ weapons are not simply going from warehouse A to warehouse B, both of which are under the control of the same group,” al-Nidawi argues.
In some ways that criticism is valid, agreed Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at the Washington-based Century InternationalĀ think tank.
But in other ways, AAH has been changing for a while, Jiyad told DW. They have seen real political successĀ and want to focus on that.
“They [AAH] believe they can increase their influence and their power by being fully involved in politics and less involved in what was previously the resistance agenda,” Jiyad says.
AAH was never the PMF group closest to Iran anyway, the Iraqi analyst points out. Other PMF members that are closer, like Kataib Hezbollah, have vowed not to give up their weapons or their “resistance” activities. Kataib Hezbollah does not have a political wing either, Jiyad added.
Iran approved?
That is possibly why groups like AAH, within the Iran-aligned factions, can make some concessions, Jiyad and al-Nidawi both say.Ā
“Iran needs influence and power, and the ability to operate in Iraq,” Nidawi explains. “So they need people who can move weapons to other Iranian allies, they need people in business suits who can create shell companies and launder money, and they need people who can shoot at Iran’s adversaries in the region. AAH’s moves don’t mean they’re abandoning their relationship with Iran. Within the bigger picture, this can be seen as a tactical allocation of assets. As in, do we have three guys fighting and five guys doing business? Or six guys fighting and two guys doing business?”
Which also means that the latest changes areĀ unlikely to achieve the US’s ultimate goal of neutralizing the danger posed by Iran’s allies in Iraq, Jiyad argues.
“Unless we get sustained stability and peace in the region, there is a strong possibility that anti-US actions still emerge from Iraq ā€” even if some groups are dissolved, or focus on politics,” Jiyad concludes. ” A pro-Iran feeling is quite strong amongĀ various groups in Iraq and large numbers of the population as well.”
So is there anything postive about militias’ promises to disarm?
In some ways, these pledgesĀ and a paramilitary that wants to be more political and civic could be goodĀ in that it portends a “less confrontational future,” al-Nidawi argues.
But, he adds, “it’s still a future that keeps Iraq tightly within Iran’s orbit, but in a way that is maybe more palatable to the US. It also completely ignores the question of accountability for past crimes by these groups,” al-Nidawi continues. “To simply normalize these groups that have been involved in mass murder, ethnic cleansing, forced disappearances and acts of terrorism within Iraq and abroad, that’s a hard pill to swallow.”
Edited by: Jess Smee