In a recent joint interview with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot media, Johannes Hahn, the European Union’s Special Envoy for Cyprus, made reference to the Turkish Cypriot community and its complex relationship with the EU.Ā
Hahn emphasized the EU’s financial commitment to the community and pointed out that the bloc has provided it with €760 million ($888 million) in support over the past 20 years.Ā
He also said that the EU remains ready to cooperate with the Turkish Cypriot side for the implementation in the northern part of the island of the EU acquis, the body of legislation, rights and obligations in place in all EU member states.
An extremely complex relationshipĀ
Hahn’s remarks hint at the extremely complex relationship between the EU and the approximately 200,000 members of the Turkish Cypriot community.Ā
This complex relationship is rooted in what is known as the “Cyprus problem,”Ā the de facto division of the island — after almost a decade of bi-communal violence, a Greek-backed coup and a Turkish military intervention in 1974 — into the Republic of Cyprus, which is now a member of the EU, and the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is not recognized by the international community.Ā
Despite joining the EU as aĀ de factoĀ divided island, theĀ whole of the island of Cyprus is EU territory. This means that mostĀ Turkish Cypriots living in the north of the island are citizens of both the Republic of Cyprus — and therefore the EU — and the TRNC, which is under Turkish military control and is administered by the institutions of the TRNC. Turkey is not a member of the EU.Ā
When Cyprus acceded to the European Union, the acquis communautaire or community acquis [the body of common rights and obligations which bind all Member States together with the European Union] was in place in the Republic of Cyprus. In that part of the island not controlled by the Republic of Cyprus, however, the acquis communautaire remains suspended, which means that the EU–Turkish Cypriot relationship does not go beyond economic support measures.Ā
As a result, while Turkish Cypriots are EU citizens on paper, they are, in practice, outside the institutions and processes of the EU.Ā
The Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan
The Turkish Cypriot community’s relationship with the EU is still governed by a decision taken in Brussels on April 26, 2004, two days after the Cyprus referenda on the Annan Plan, a UN proposal for resolving the Cyprus problem, and five days before the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU.Ā
According to the EU Council of General Affairs, the Greek Cypriot community’s rejection of the Annan Plan on April 24, 2004 left the Cyprus problem unresolved and the Turkish Cypriots in limbo regarding their EU status, despite the fact that a majority of Turkish Cypriots voted for the plan and, therefore, for EU accession.Ā
EU commitment to the Turkish Cypriot community
As a result, the EU Council of General Affairs made a political commitment to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community, promote the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging economic development, integrate the island economically and strengthen the community’s ties with the EU — all of which would be helped by the implementation of the community acquisĀ in the northern part of the island.
To further this commitment, the European Commission submitted three proposals to the European Council to support the Turkish Cypriots ahead of Cyprus’s accession to the EU.Ā
These included both financial support and specific legal arrangements to facilitate the community’s economic activity.
Where does the EU money go?
The first proposal, which was approved by the European Council, involved direct financial support for the Turkish Cypriot community through the Aid Regulation for the Turkish Cypriots.Ā
This remains the EU’s primary tool of presence in the community, channeling over €760 million since 2004 into infrastructure projects such as water and sewage system construction and upgrades and wastewater treatment facilities.Ā
Part of the annual funding program also supports education and civil society. In 2025 alone, €5 million in grants were awarded to Turkish Cypriot students to study at European universities.Ā
Grants are also provided to Turkish Cypriot farmers and producers to align with EU food safety standards. Implementation is carried out by UN agencies such as the UN Development Programme and the UN Office for Project Services, thus avoiding involvement of the authorities in the TRNC or political recognition of it.Ā
Most EU funds for Turkish Cypriots are directed to bi-communal committees, operating with UN support, to facilitate cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots primarily on humanitarian issues.Ā
Such committees include the Bi-Communal Cultural Heritage Committee for the restoration of monuments and the Committee on Missing Persons.Ā
Turkish Cypriot politicians have on occasion criticized the mechanism of providing funding through bi-communal committees. They argue that EU aid should be used for the development of the Turkish Cypriot community itself, rather than being shared with Greek Cypriots.
Green Line Regulation
The second major area of EU involvement concerns the Green Line Regulation.Ā
Also approved by the European Council, this regulation provides a legal framework for the movement of people and goods across the Green Line — the de facto border between the two parts of the island — without recognizing or legitimizing the northern administration as a state entity.Ā
This regulation allows Turkish Cypriots to trade specific products with the Republic of Cyprus and through it into the EU without paying duties, provided those products meet EU standards.Ā
Nevertheless, the community’s ability to trade products from the north remains limited as a third EU Commission proposal for direct trade between Turkish Cypriots and EU member states was blocked by the Republic of Cyprus at both the European Council and Parliament levels.
TowardĀ a new integration policy?
According to Dr. Niyazi Kizilyurek, the first Turkish Cypriot MEP, who stood for the Greek Cypriot left-wing AKEL party, economic support for the Turkish Cypriot community does not, on its own, constitute a policy of integration of Turkish Cypriots into the EU.Ā
Kizilyurek told DW that the EU needs to reassess its approach and take bold, substantive steps towardĀ integration.Ā
Referring to the founding vision of European unification by Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet — which is based on practical cooperation and shared interests — Kizilyurek advocates for European projects that he says would strengthen meaningful cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.Ā
He proposes, for example, projects such as a bi-communal hospital under EU auspices, joint education initiatives such as mixed schools or a shared university, and joint platforms such as a bi-communal radio station or television channel.Ā
Kizilyurek notes that a coherent policy of integration is hampered by both sides: on the one hand by Turkey, which does not encourage the engagement of Turkish Cypriots with the EU, and on the other by the Republic of Cyprus, whose policy towardĀ Turkish Cypriots is influenced by fears of indirectly recognizing what it sees as a “pseudo-state” and by the perception that benefits for Turkish Cypriots reduce that community’s incentive to resolve the Cyprus problem.
Turkish criticism of the EU
Turkey’s stance on the EU–Turkish Cypriot relationship can be summed up by its view that the EU made a historic mistake in accepting the Republic of Cyprus into the bloc. It feels that Cyprus’s accession to the EU essentially puts the Turkish Cypriot community at a disadvantage.Ā
This position was recently reiterated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who referred to the “historic mistake of the EU in accepting the Greek Cypriot administration,” which, he said, had disappointed the Turkish Cypriots.Ā
Commenting on the fact that Cyprus currently holds the rotating presidency of the EU, Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesperson Oncu Keceli took a similar line, claiming that the EU ignores the existence of Turkish Cypriots and shows that it is neither neutral nor constructive on the Cyprus problem.
Edited by: Aingeal Flanagan